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 Americans oldest past time, baseball, has turned into a multi- billion dollar industry under 
Major League Baseball alone.   Baseball is an entertainment industry that is driven by putting a 
profitable, entertaining, and competitive product on the field to draw the fans to the games  or 
televisions.   However, in the late 90’s, claims of a lack of competitive balance due to large 
market team spending became loud and widespread.  An uncompetitive and unentertaining 
product would clearly cut into the profits of Major League Baseball.  This was a fact that Bud 
Selig was well aware of when he commissioned the Blue Ribbon Panel, a panel of experts,  to 
evaluate these claims in 2000.  The Blue Ribbon Panel concluded that the claims of a growing 
lack of competitive balance due to large market spending were correct. This conclusion lead Bud 
Selig to revamp the revenue sharing and luxury tax structure of the league to put a more well 
balanced product on the field.  However, the Blue Ribbon Panel largely used wins to measure 
competitive play.  Wins, being a binary statistic, prevented a truly precise comparison between 
the teams of the league to be made.    This study aims to learn the story left untold by the Blue 
Ribbon Panel and other academic studies of the 1990’s by creating a measure of team strength 
based on the gambling markets perception of competitive play. After all, human perception of 
competitive play is what the industry should be most concerned about.  Using this newly created 
measure of competitive play, this study observed a change in competitive balance, but could not 
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1.  Introduction 
Drugs, unemployment, and income gap disparity sound like topics to be covered  
in a current political debate, but also aptly describes  Major League Baseball (MLB) in 
the 1990s. Memories of Sammy Sosa and Mark McGwire homerun trots overshadow the 
on-the-field success of the New York Yankees and Atlanta Braves.  Unfortunately, 
memories of Mark McGwire standing in front of his locker being questioned about his 
use of steroids and the subsequent concern of the use of steroids in professional sports are 
remembered soon after.  It was also the home of the only strike in American sports 
history that caused the cancelation of an entire post season. Even with all this drama 
surrounding the game, an age old political hotbed issue of the haves and have nots leaked 
its way into baseball.  The league was starting to lack competitive balance with the big 
market teams seemingly outspending the small market teams to the point the small 
market teams simply couldn’t compete on the field.  Baseball is a marketplace that is 
relatively unaffected by outside factors.  Evaluating the effect of team spending in such a 
market place is of particular interest to an economist and will be the subject of this paper. 
 In a traditional marketplace, firms compete with one another. Major League 
Baseball differs in this aspect as it is more of a joint venture between 30 distinct firms.  
The league can be seen as a joint venture because of the nature of the product being sold.  
A marketable baseball game requires two teams to play and for both teams to be 




requirements give each team an interest in ensuring its competitors are profitable enough 
to put together a competitive product on the field.   
Further strengthening the joint venture aspect of Major League Baseball is the 
rather protected market share each team enjoys from their geographic location and the 
inability for firms to freely encroach on their geographic location.  This negates much of 
the need to drive competitors out of business. In fact, baseball teams have long been 
divided into two groups based on their set geographic market: big market and small 
market teams.  The division  of teams based on market size naturally arises in the sport, 
as observed by the Blue Ribbon Panel, an average of 79% of team revenue comes from 
local revenue sources (Levin et al.).  The significance of teams deriving most of their 
revenue from local revenue sources is highlighted when the size of the natural local 
markets are taken into account.  For example, in 1999 the Yankee’s local revenue was 
$176 Million.  This figure dwarfed the poorest team in the league, the Expos, who only 
had a meager $12 million in local revenue (Levin et al.).  Logically, higher revenue leads 
to a higher ability to reinvest into the team payroll.  This can be seen with the 
corresponding drastic gap in payrolls with the Yankees spending $88 million compared to 
the Expos spending a mere $16 million (USA News).   While some of the gap in local 
revenue could possibly be explained by the struggles of the Expos vs. the Yankees’ wild 
success, the effect of being located in a large market cannot be discounted as seen by the 
Los Angeles Dodgers with large local revenue of over $100 million despite having a 




Teams cannot freely choose their own location or else a clustering of teams 
around a few big markets would likely occur.  This creates a sizeable advantage that 
some teams naturally have over others and a reason of concern for supporters of a level 
playing field. On face value, Bud Selig and Major League Baseball did have reason to 
listen to the fans’ complaints about the big market issue.  In the latter part of the 1990’s, 
the New York Yankees won 4 of 5 world championships.  Perhaps, not coincidently, 
during this same half of the decade the team payroll and revenue disparities were 
reaching all time highs.  Watching the New York Yankees increasingly put more money 
into the their teams payroll and the corresponding on the field success that appeared to 
produce, it is obvious why fans were concerned over the state of the league. 
 The perception of the fans about the diminishing level of competitive balance of 
the league was shared by a report created by a Blue Ribbon Panel.  This report, to be 
discussed later in the paper, stated the large market teams were gaining a growing 
advantage in the post strike years of the decade in the form of larger revenues and in turn 
team payrolls.  The report argued this trend was affecting the ability of the smaller market 
teams to put competitive teams on the field with the large market teams buying a 
disproportionate amount of  the talent.  The study suggested this was of alarming 
importance due to the idea that Major League Baseball teams were not selling 30 
individual products, but one combined product.  This idea of one common product would 
necessitate a need for reform on the financial side of the league to correct the imbalance 
on the playing field.  In fact, this thought process prompted Major League Baseball to 




team was not overly determined by market size.  With the natural disadvantage faced by 
small market teams, competitive balance promoting measures such as a luxury tax and 
revenue sharing were championed by supporters of a more competitively balanced 
league. 
After the Blue Ribbon Panel’s report, a new revamped revenue sharing system 
was installed in 2000 and a new luxury tax system was put in place in 2003. On face 
value, these two tools used to promote competitive balance seem to have worked.  Since 
the 2001 MLB season, nine different teams have won a world series in eleven seasons.  
This is a stark contrast to the Yankee-dominated late 1990s. Additionally, since the 
installation of both tools, revenue and payroll disparities have narrowed.  Based on the 
casual observation of the seemingly increased competitive balance of the league in the 
2000s with the decreased gap in team payrolls, a conclusion could be drawn that the 
driving force behind competitive imbalance of the league was in fact the disparity of 
payrolls.  Whether this conclusion can be supported by more concrete evidence will be 
examined  in this paper. 
 Evaluating traditional statistics used in the Blue Ribbon Panel report such as wins 
and playoff success, the story behind the seemingly growing lack of competitive play in 
baseball seems clear cut.  Large payroll disparities were leading to large disparities in the 
quality of teams’ play on the field.  However, these more traditional statistics are not 
without their flaws when it comes to measuring competitive balance.  A win or a loss 




actually was.  Finding a way to measure competitive play may seem impossible, as it is 
essentially trying to find a way to measure a fans perception of what competitive play is.   
Fortunately, a past time that is as old and as popular as baseball itself, offers a 
unique way to measure the fans’ perception of competitive play.  Gambling on 
competitive events is an age-old pastime that has evolved into a large market .  In 2007, 
legal bookmaking grossed over $168 million the United States alone  (American Gaming 
Association).   The usefulness of betting lines in measuring competitive play is obvious, 
as betting lines offer a way to turn human perception of the competitive ability of a team 
into a quantifiable number.  Gamblers watch the baseball games and are able to get a 
firsthand insight on the true ability of the teams playing.  This insight is then used to 
predict the outcome of future games.  Betting lines differ from win-loss statistics as the 
lines are not a binary statistic. The lines show what team is perceived as better and to 
what degree. 
 This paper tackles the question of whether big market spending is affecting the 
competitive balance of Major League Baseball through the use of betting lines and a 
pricing model adopted from a paper written by Raymond Sauer in 1993.  Section II of 
this paper presents a review of previous literature on measuring the competitive balance 
in baseball.  Section III illustrates the usefulness and validity of using betting lines to 
measure competitive balance with the help of previous literature on the subject.  In 




model used to test them.  Section V and VI breaks down the results of the pricing model 




















2.1 Previous Studies of Competitive Balance in MLB 
After the 1994 strike and the following five years of Yankee domination, Bud 
Selig commissioned a Blue Ribbon Panel to examine the declining level of the 
competitive balance in Major League Baseball.  Using wins, playoff appearances, playoff 
wins, revenue, and payroll as the study’s main criteria, the Blue Ribbon Panel set off to 
explore the effect the growing payroll and revenue disparities were having on the 
competitive balance of the league.  The study came to a strong conclusion in support of 
the idea that payroll and revenue disparities were the primary culprits causing the lack of 
competitiveness from the small market teams.  This conclusion led the Blue Ribbon Panel 
to recommend that each team put forty to fifty percent of its local revenue into a 
combined pool controlled by the league. 
 To analyze the relationship between competitive balance and payroll disparities 
during 1995-1999, the study split the league into four quartiles ranked by payroll for each 
year examined and then compared how successful each quartile was in terms of wins and 
playoff success.  Using these criteria to measure the competitive balance of the league, it 










Table 1- Blue Ribbon Panel’s Results 


















1995 $46.40  80.6 $36.90  19.4 $31.40  0 $17.80  0 
1996 50 78 37.9 22 28.1 0 18.2 0 
1997 57.4 97 45.3 3 35.4 0 21.5 0 
1998 64 73 50.1 27 35.4 0 18 0 
1999 78.8 94 55.7 6 41 0 20.2 0 
Avg.   84.52   15.48   0   0 
 
* League is divided into 4 quartiles, ranked by payroll with Quartile 1 being the 
highest 
*Data obtained from the Blue Ribbon Panel (L ev in ,  Mi t ch e l ,  Vo l ck er ,  
W i l l )   
 As observed from the table above, teams in the top payroll quartile won over 84% 
of the playoff games that took place in the following five seasons.   This is a stark 
contrast to the teams in the bottom two quartiles who won zero playoff games in those 
five years!  Teams in the 2
nd
 quartile did not fare much better as only one team from the 




clearly had a stranglehold on post season success.  The question that follows is, what 
caused Quartile 1 teams to be undeniably head and shoulders above the rest of the 
league? 
 Looking at the graph below, it is quite obvious how one could be drawn to the 
conclusion that the driving force of Quartile 1’s dominance during this era was the 
growing payroll disparity.  During the time period evaluated in the study, the average 
payroll of Quartile 1 teams increased by $28 million.  This amount was seven times 
larger than the $4 million increase in payroll seen by Quartile 4 teams.  Coincidently, the 
total revenue of Quartile 1 teams had a 71% higher growth rate than the Quartile 4 teams.  
Superficially, a link can be drawn between the differing growth rates amongst the 
Quartiles and their respective success on the field. 




















 The Blue Ribbon Panel identified local revenue as the main culprit for the 
growing disparity.  Local revenue accounts for the majority of a team’s overall revenue, 
giving larger market teams a natural advantage on being able to invest more in the team 
via payroll. The study’s conclusion falls in line with the growing popular sentiment that 
small market teams were at a natural disadvantage. 
 Seven years after the Blue Ribbon Panel report,  Elanjian and  
Pachamanova(2009) investigated how much the competitive balance had changed in the 
league in recent years.  Dividing the teams into quartiles, Elanjian and  Pachamanova 
compared  payroll, revenue, and wins for the  years following the Blue Ribbon Panel 
(2000-2007) to evaluate the effect the current revenue sharing system has had on 
baseball.  During the time period evaluated, the study found that the revenue and payroll 
gaps amongst the Quartiles had diminished in the 2000s.   To illustrate this in more detail, 
Quartile 1’s payroll in the 1995-1999 post-strike years grew at a staggering 10.42 
percent, a figure that dwarfed Quartile 4’s 1.75 percent growth.  The opposite happened 
in the 2000s where the growth rates had practically reversed, with Quartile 4 
experiencing a 5.86% average growth compared to quartile 1’s 1.14%. 
 Despite the significant progress made in closing the payroll and revenue gaps, 
only minor progress was made in improving the regular season success of the teams.  To 
evaluate this phenomenon further, the authors ran a simple regression on payroll’s effect 
on winning percentage.  This simple regression was run separately for the late 90s and the 




time frames.  As evident by the small progress in competitive play despite the large 
progress on payroll disparities, the regression showed that payroll had a much smaller 
effect on winning percentage in the 2000s.  Looking at the table below taken from the 
paper, payroll’s effect on winning percentages had shrunk to almost one third of what it 
















Table 2- Study on Revenue Sharing Results 
 
However, these studies, similar to the media’s perception, assumed market size 
was the problem and then set off to gather evidence to support this initial assumption.  
This idea was put to the test by a response to the Blue Ribbon Panel report that 
questioned whether market size was really the driving factor in the lack of competitive 
balance.  “Competitive Balance and Market Size in Major League Baseball: a Response 
to Baseball’s Blue Ribbon Panel”  set out to define market size and then show the effect 
that factors correlated to market size had on winning percentage.  
 When market size was defined by population and per capita income, Schmidt and 
Berry(2001) found little correlation between market size and on the field success.  For 
example, Cleveland experienced great success in the late ‘90s when the large market 
teams were said to have gained a massive competitive advantage.  Considering Cleveland 
ranks 20
th
 as a Metropolitan Statistical Area, this is quite contrary to what would be 
expected.  Additionally, Boston ranked 10
th
 as a MSA and showed miserable results on 




measures such as per capita income and population and on-the-field success measured by 
winning percentage. 
 Taking an alternative view on the definition of market size, Schmidt and 
Berri(2001) turned to revenue and payroll measures, which are how the Blue Ribbon 
Panel defined market size.   To further explore this relationship of market size and 
success on the field, Schmidt and Berri(2001) used the statistical measure of a Gini 
coefficient to show how evenly wins were distributed across the league.  The Gini 
coefficients were with ranked by their relationship to various exogenous factors and 
endogenous factors. Doing this allowed the authors to examine how endogenous and 
exogenous factors were affecting the competitive balance of the league. 
 Schmidt and Berri   did find some correlation between endogenous factors and 
success on the field.   However, the interesting aspect here is that this correlation was not 
found to be consistent and only seemed to last for brief periods of time.  Citing the 
failures of the big spending Los Angeles Dodgers and Baltimore Orioles, the authors 
hypothesized that market size no matter how it was defined is not the driving force 
behind success on the field.  Rather, the quality of the team’s front office and 
management dictated the quality of the product produced on the field.  Furthermore, they 
bring up an interesting point on simultaneity of “large market” factors such as revenue 
and payroll and success on the field.  A better product on the field would be expected to 




the big payroll teams were good because of their payroll or because their payroll was 
high because they were good. 
 One major assumption being made in all these previous studies was that the 
current state of affairs in baseball somehow differed from the historic state of competitive 
balance.  Considering the Yankees do have twenty seven world championships, this may 
not be the case.  Fortunately, Schmidt and Berri   put this assumption to test in their paper 
“Competitive balance and attendance: The case of Major League Baseball".   Schmidt 
and Berri   actually went back and compared this decade’s state of competitive balance to 
that of every decade of the past century.   Unlike any of the previously mentioned studies 
in this paper, this study put the current state of baseball into the context of the history of 
baseball.  By doing so, Schmidt and Berri could observe whether the current growth in 
payroll gaps was actually causing the competitive state of baseball to differ from 
historical levels. 
 Similar to the previous two studies, this study measures competitive balance off a 
team’s record.  Like their previously mentioned paper, Schmidt and Berri (2001)  
developed a Gini Coefficient to measure how evenly distributed wins were across the 
league over each decade.  By calculating a Gini coefficient for each season dating all the 
way back to 1901, the authors were able to put into context the supposed current decline 
in the competitive balance.  With this new found context, the Schmidt and Berri   came to 
the conclusion that the ‘90s were actually the most competitive decade of the century!  




measure competitive balance.  However, the Blue Ribbon Panel did not put their 
conclusion into context of the history of baseball, which was an omission that skewed the 
story being told by the statistics they uncovered. 
2.2 The Use of Betting Lines to Measure Competitive Play 
This is not to say the work done by the Blue Ribbon Panel isn’t without its merits.  
It brings up the very important correlation between payroll and post season success in the 
1990’s.  The question that then follows is: if the 90’s were the most competitive decade 
in the history of baseball based on win percentages then why were the top payroll teams 
displaying such dominance over the lower three quarters of the league in the post season?  
A solid answer may be found in the argument put forth in the paper “Using Betting 
Market Odds to Measure the Uncertainty of Outcome in Major League Baseball”.  Paul, 
Weinbach, Borghesi, and Wilson(2009) illustrate that wins and win percentages may not 
be the best statistic to build any type of measure of competitive balance on. 
 This study sets out to attempt to answer why there was such a large discrepancy in 
the fans perception of the competitive balance of the 90s and the work done by Schmidt 
and Berri showing that it was actually the most competitive decade ever.  To do this the 
authors take a unique approach and question whether wins are capturing the whole story 
of what is happening during a game.  In place of wins the authors turn to betting lines to 
measure the change in competitive balance in baseball.   Betting lines reflect the 
gambling markets expected outcome of a matchup in form a money line.  With a higher 




possible to essentially measure the changing level of the fans perception of the 
competitiveness of the games over the course of the time period studied (1990-2006).    
 What the authors found was that fans were increasingly and significantly more 
certain of the outcome of the game.  The betting lines increased in favor of the favorite by 
a total of ten percent over the course of the 1990s.  More interestingly, the study found 
that the trend continued into the 2000’s. The same decade that saw significant progress in 
the payroll gaps between the large and small market teams.  The use of betting lines by 
the authors allowed a way to bridge the gap between the statistics and the fans perception 
of the game that was sorely missing in the previous studies trying to explain the fans 
perception of competitive balance based purely off statistics. 
While betting lines offer a creative approach to turn human perception into a 
quantifiable statistic, they are still biased as they  are derived from human perception.  
Thus, there is a need to test the efficiency and biasedness of betting lines.    The article 
“The Market Efficiency and the Favorite Longshot Bias: The Baseball Betting Market” 
does just that.  The authors, Linda M. Woodland and Bill M. Woodland(1994), cite 
previous literature on racetrack betting as their motivation to examine the baseball betting 
market.  In this cited racetrack literature, a longshot bias is discovered revealing a market 
inefficiency where bettors over bet on heavy underdogs and under bet on favorites.  The 
authors believe the baseball betting markets resemble a more pure market similar to the 
stock market and such inefficiencies will not exist.  They put this hypothesis to the test 




   First, the authors test the efficiency of a single randomly selected baseball game.  
A betting line on this game is deemed efficient if the probability of an underdog win does 
not differ from the objective probability of an underdog win.  Simply, a betting line is 
efficient if it’s not being biased by some form of human behavior that would lead bettors 
to place bets on underdogs disproportionally to their rational probability of winning.  An 
example of this type of human behavior would be excessive risk taking.  The results of 
this test showed an incredibly efficient market with only 3 of 26 lines rejecting the null 
hypothesis at a ten percent level. Next, a second test is done with all the lines on the 
baseball game aggregated   together rather than examined individually.  The results of 
this test do reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency at the ten percent level. 
 Turning to a final test, the authors examine if wagering only on underdogs returns 
higher profits than would be allowed for in an efficient market.  If the strategy of 
wagering only on underdogs is inefficiency profitable, the market overvalues favorites.  
After running the test, the authors do detect market inefficiency.  Particularly, this 
inefficiency is significant in games with heavy favorites.  While the authors did find 
some deviation from consistency, they conclude it is not sufficient enough to exist as a 
profitable wagering strategy. 
 In total, the authors conclude the results of these test verify the baseball betting 
market is sufficiently efficient.  With this verification, this papers approach of using 
betting’s as a measure of competitive balance stands on more concrete grounds.  If the 




irrational human behavior such as risk taking or fan bias.  This would make betting’s a 
poor fit to be used to get an accurate perception of competitive play.   
 However, this study does offer one concern that needs to be examined in this 
paper.  A test for reverse long shot bias will need to be tested for in this paper to see if 

















3. Data Review 
This paper uses three main pieces of data: win percentages, betting lines, and 
team payroll.  These pieces of data were chosen to get a full picture of the story that was 
laid out piecemeal in the literature review section.  Winning percentages are the classic 
measure of competitive balance and will be compared to the results of my new approach.  
Team payroll will be used to rank the teams by payroll for each year.  By ranking the 
teams by payroll, an insight can be gained into the market size debate.  Lastly money 
lines will be used, because as previously argued they will help develop a more accurate 
measure of competitive balance.  This section of the paper will give a thorough 
examination of the data itself during the years 1989 to 2006. 
3.1 Money Lines 
 In betting the money line shows the payout of a wager placed on the outcome of a 
specific game.  For example a money line of -170 shows that it would take a wager of 
170 dollars to win 100 dollars.  This team would be considered a heavy favorite to win, 
so the payout is relatively low to compensate.  Conversely, a money line of -170 would 
allow a better to gamble 100 dollars for a chance to win 170 dollars.   This team is an 
underdog with a lower perceived chance of winning.  Thus, an increased incentive is 




  The higher the absolute value of a money line, the more certain gamblers are of 
the outcome of that specific match up.  In fact, the estimated certainty of the outcome 
implied by the money line can actually be calculated by converting money lines into 
probability.  By converting money lines into probability, the bettor’s forecasted outcome 
of a matchup is turned into a quantifiable percentage.  Not only does this make 
comparing the favorite and underdog lines easier, but also allows for a clean comparison 
with winning percentages.   For the purpose of this paper, the money lines will be 
converted into probabilities.  This is done with the simple formula shown below: 
For favorites,  Money line/(Money line +1) 
For underdogs, 1/(Money line+1) 
 Intrusively the use of betting lines would do a great deal to bridge the gap 
between fans perception and the statistics used in studies.  Betting lines eliminate a good 
deal of fan bias as gamblers have a financial stake in the outcome of the game.  
Additionally, betting lines give a fuller picture about the true competitive nature of a 
game that classily used statistics cannot offer.  For example, a win simply shows the 
outcome of the game.  The score, be it 10-1 or 1-0, isn’t taken into account.  This leaves 
much to be desired when trying to precisely evaluate competitive play.  Betting lines 
eliminate this problem as they are predictions based on the witnessed skill level 
differences between the two teams.  Betting lines offer a really good midpoint between 




When looking at the league as a whole, the issue with money lines or the 
probability derived from money lines is that if you take an average across the league the 
average will always be around 50%.  Obviously, as one team always wins and one team 
always loses a game.  This makes for a poor tool to look at for a year to year league wide 
comparison.  To combat this, an Index of Dissimilarity can be derived to get a superficial 
glance of the competitive balance of the league on a yearly basis.  The Index of 
Dissimilarity will be calculated to show how evenly the probability of winning is spread 
across the league.  This will illustrate the competitive balance of the league because if the 
Index of Dissimilarity is high it shows a lack of competitiveness in the league. With some 
teams expected to win a large percentage of the games and some teams not expected to 
win many, a high Index of Dissimilarity would really work well to determine years in 
which the playing field was not competitive. 
The formula used in this paper to compute the I.D. is as follows: 
I.D.= .5*Sum |Teams proportion of total teams   -Teams percentage of Money Lines 
probability of winning| 
 Moving back to the money line probabilities, an I.D. was computed to show 
competitive balance of the league as a whole without respect to payroll.  Shown in the 






Table 3- Money Line I.D.’s 



















2006 0.04504  
                                                 
 Looking at the table, the Index of Dissimilarity was relatively low in the early 
90’s indicating that a low reallocation of the team probabilities will have to be done to 
make the league perfectly competitive.  However, the table show a steady upward trend 
in the I.D. as the league became more unbalanced.  The fans perception on the state of the 
league appears to have been correct as the I.D. almost tripled from its valley in 1991 to its 
peak in 2002.  The league in fact did become increasingly less competitive in the later 
90’s and into the early 2000’s.  
 One curious observation can be made by comparing the 90’s to the 2000’s.  In the 
90’s, the top few teams like the Yankees and Braves dominated the decade. While in the 




this isn’t reflected in the Index of Dissimilarity statistics.  The I.D.’s of the 2000’s show 
that the league is much less balanced than the 90’s.  A less balanced league, but one that 
creates a greater variety of champions is certainly an interesting phenomenon.  It will be 
interesting to see if the winning percentage statistics show a similar story 
3.2 Winning Percentages 
 Winning percentages have classically been used to define the strength of a team 
as they show the percentage of games won out of the total games played.  Two large 
issues with winning percentages exist, however, in the form of team scheduling and 
excluding the score of the game.  Teams in weak divisions will have an easier time 
winning games.  This makes a comparison between teams based purely on winning 
percentages imperfect.  Additionally, the true competitive story of the games is ignored 
by winning percentages.  
 However, it would be lazy for this paper to simply ignore winning percentages.  It 
is important to know how winning percentages and money lines compare over the time 
period examined.   Calculating an Index of Dissimilarity for winning percentage really 
offers to give an exciting insight.  One of the main premises behind using betting lines is 
the argument that the whole story isn’t being caught up in classic statistics like winning 
percentages.  By comparing the two head to head as raw statistics, it wouldn’t allow for a 
true comparison.  Winning percentages across the league will always average to near fifty 




comparison can be made.   If the two differ drastically, it would explain why fans 
perception was saying a different story than that of the stat sheet.   
 
Figure 3- Trend of Winning Percentages I.D 
                 
                    
 As the graph above shows, the I.D. of winning percentages offers a much 
different story than the I.D. of betting lines.   While both trends show a similar pattern, 
the I.D. of winning percentages  is full of peaks and valleys and not a steady drastic 
upward trend as shown in the graph of the I.D.’s of betting lines.  The I.D. of Money 
lines never comes close to reproaching its low value in 1991, whereas the I.D. of  
winning percentages approaches its low value on multiple occasions.  The I.D.’s of 























































































the heart of the growing lack of competitiveness as shown by the Yankee domination and 
the I.D. of betting lines, the I.D. of the winning percentage is actually at a range wide 
low.   
 The great variation of the I.D.’s of the winning percentages makes it much harder 
to piece together a story with the information at hand.  However this difficulty tells a 
story in itself.  Perhaps this variation in I.D. of winning percentages could be used to 
explain while reports such as the Blue Ribbon Panel use wins and winning percentages to 
show a growing lack of competitive balance.  While the paper “Competitive balance and 
attendance: The case of Major League Baseball”, shows the league at an all-time high in 
terms of competitive balance.  An analysis on the variation of winning percentages and 
the variation of the conclusions research papers using winning percentages as a measure 
of competitive balance would make an interesting paper topic by itself. 
3.3 Team Payrolls 
Team payrolls are needed to evaluate team’s spending effect on competitive play.  
Rather than do a direct analysis on payroll’s effect on competitive play, payroll will 
simply be used to divide the league into quartiles.  The quartiles will then be compared to 
show how they differ with respect to competitive play.  Dividing the teams into quartiles 
allows for an insight into the debate centered on big market teams having a natural 
advantage over small market teams.  Additionally, it falls in line with the approach 
previous literature has used to tackle this subject.  Thus making the results of this paper 




 The teams in each quartile will change on a yearly basis as the quartiles are 
defined on spending patterns.  Rather than a direct comparison on big market and small 
market teams, this will give an insight into the spending behavior of teams and its effect 
on competitive play.  Ranking teams by their spending behavior gives an excellent insight 
into payrolls effects on competitive play.  A big market team is simply a team that spends 
like a big market team should.  This avoids the problem of thrifty owners.  Additionally, 
this ranking and use of payroll falls in line with previous literature.  The results of this 
paper can be compared to studies like the Blue Ribbon Panel report to see if the big 
market teams were actually pulling away as strongly as the report suggested. 
Obviously, even  the most casual fan can look at  team salaries across the league 
and see that the landscape has drastically changed over the past two decades.  However, 
creating an Index of Dissimilarity offers two quick and interesting insights.  First, it gives 
a rather easy measure to show by how much the gap of the team payrolls has changed on 
a yearly basis.  Secondly, it gives a rudimentary way to compare how the balance of the 
team payroll differs than the balance of competitive play in a single year. 
 As commonly known, the I.D. shows the phenomena of drastic growth and 
divergence in team payrolls across the league.  Additionally, it shows how this 
divergence has leveled off in the 2000’s.  All in all, the I.D. of payroll seems to mirror 
that of the betting lines.  Both showing steady positive trends that level off at the end of 
the data range.  However, the largest difference is simply in the raw I.D. itself.  The 




payroll gaps is shown to have a much smaller corresponding growth on a teams average 
betting line. 
Figure 4- Trend of Payroll I.D. 
                                                                                                                     
 
3.4 Long Shot Bias Test 
One issue that needs to be addressed from the literature review section is that of 
the reverse long shot bias.   A reverse long-shot bias suggest that bettors over bet on 
favorites.   As discussed in “The Reverse Favourite–longshot Bias and Market Efficiency in 
Major League Baseball: An Update” the baseball betting market has evidence that shows it is 
influenced by these phenomena.   If these phenomena were strong in the baseball betting 
market, it would be a large cause of concern for this paper.  A strong reverse-long shot 
















the strength of the favorites would then be exaggerated.    Obviously, if the best team’s 
strength was being exaggerated in the betting lines then the league would appear less 
competitive than it really is. 
 To test for the reverse long shot bias, this paper will use a simple test based on 
home team betting lines and the percentage of games actually won by the home team.    
Simply if the home team wins significantly fewer games than is predicted by the home 
team betting line, a reverse-long shot bias exist in this set of data.    Home teams are on 
average favored to win throughout this data set, thus making this test suitable to test if 
favorites are being overly favored in the betting market. 
 After converting the home team betting lines into probabilities, a comparison 
between probabilities and win percentages is clean and simple.  Essentially this test is 
comparing the probability of the home team winning against the percentage of games 
they actually won.  The results can be seen in the table below. 
 On first glance, the average across all seasons shows that the home team’s 
probability of winning was a fairly accurate predictor of wins.  Only a slight bias was 
seen with the betting lines over predicting home wins by 2.7 percent.  However on closer 
examination, the probability of winning is shown to be even more accurate.     
 In eight of the eighteen seasons, the difference between the home team probability 
of winning and actual winning percentage is less than one percent.   Conversely, the 
home team probability of winning is only two or more percent greater than the actual 




While a slight and consistent bias is seen towards home teams, this bias is not significant 
enough to discredit betting lines as a measure of competitive balance.    Overall, betting 



















The goal of this paper is to evaluate how significantly team payroll spending is 
affecting the competitive balance of the league.  To make this evaluation, this paper 
needs to devise a way to quantify competitive play into a statistic that can be compared 
on a yearly basis.  Essentially, a statistic measuring one team’s strength in comparison to 
the rest of the league is needed.  Once this statistic is computed, the league can be divided 
into payroll quartiles to analyze the relationship between a team being at specific payroll 
level and team strength.  Finally, this analysis can be looked at on a year to year basis to 
find out if any change in the payroll gaps had a corresponding change in team strength 
gaps. 
 As previously stated, the first issue is to develop a statistic to quantify team 
strength in relation to the rest of the league.  This is a fairly difficult task as traditional 
statistics such as wins are heavily influenced by uneven scheduling. Thus, making wins 
flawed in comparing team strength when teams are in different divisions or leagues.  A 
more unique approach is needed.  Fortunately, the paper “Fundamentals or Noise? 
Evidence from the Professional Basketball Betting Market” offers a statistic that may be 
adopted for used of this paper.  
 In the aforementioned paper, Brown and Sauer(1993) use a  pricing model to turn 
the point spread lines used in the gambling market into a measure of team strength.  The 




NBA game’s Point Spread= Home team advantage coefficient + Sum (Team Ability) 
*Dummy Variable if team is home or away + Market information. 
 The model states that the point spread used by gamblers is essentially computed 
by finding the difference in team ability and adding a constant for home field advantage.  
Consideration for market information such as injuries is also taken into account.   
  By plugging the above pricing model into a statistical regression with the point 
spread as the dependent variable, coefficients can be calculated to show how much a 
team being involved in game effects the point spread.    These coefficients are effectively 
measures of team strength.  Unlike wins, these coefficients avoid the problem of uneven 
scheduling by allowing for a larger variance in the statistical range.  A win is simply a 
binary statistic that is a 1 or 0.  This measure of team strength can be 10 or -8.  This 
larger range of statistics allows for a more precise insight into team strength in relation to 
the rest of the league. 
 This pricing model can easily be adapted for use in Major League Baseball and 
money lines as shown below. 
Probability of winning from Money Lines=Home field effects +Sum (Team ability) * 
Dummy variable if team is home or away+ Market Effects 
 Money lines make a more suitable dependent variable in Major League Baseball 
as teams such as the 2010 Giants have shown the ability to win a lot of games and the 
World Series while having low margin of victories.  The low margin of victories comes 




 However, two small tweaks will be made the Dr. Sauer’s pricing model before 
use in this paper.  The first is that the pricing model will be used to run two separate 
regressions.  One for each league, to minimize the problem of uneven scheduling.  The 
second tweak will be done to the coefficient themselves. Simply, the true adjusted 
coefficient is the coefficient of the team ability minus the league average team ability.  
Leaving a simple interpretation of how much better or worse a team is than the league 
average.  Additionally, the balance of the league is easily derived from these new 
















5.1Team Strength Coefficient Trend Analysis 
In the data review section, a very superficial analysis was given on the changing 
level of competitive balance over the time period studied.  However, this analysis 
examined the league as a whole and left a lot of the story behind the competitive balance 
of the league untold.   A much deeper insight is given with the regression analysis test as 
the league is broken down and examined by individual teams.   By doing an analysis on 
the individual teams, a deeper and more precise analysis can be given on the relationship 
between competitive balance and the gap between team payrolls. 
From the I.D. of the money lines, the league was seen to get significantly less 
balanced.  Intuitively, it would be expected that Quartile 1 teams were simply pulling 
away as baseball fanatics everywhere argued.  The graph below shows this is partially 











Figure 5- Team Strength Coefficient by Quartile 
 
 The graph above indicates three unique trends of competitive balance during the 
time period examined.  The first trend occurred during 1989 to 1992.  The top three 
Quartiles were closely grouped together, with Quartile 4 lagging far behind.    Team 
strength coefficients being built on the betting markets perception of a team’s strength, 
having the top three quartiles grouped so closely together would indicate that the 

























































































 The second trend saw Quartile 1 separate itself drastically from Quartile 2 and 
Quartile 3.  This trend occurred between the years 1993 to 2000.  Starting roughly in 
1993, Quartile 1’s average team strength coefficient began to rise.  Quartile 2’s average 
team strength coefficient stagnated and Quartile 3’s average team strength coefficient 
dropped dramatically.    Factoring these three growth rates together, the league saw 
Quartile 1 teams really begin to display dominance. Considering these team strength 
coefficients are based on gamblers perception of a team’s probability of winning, 
Quartile 1 teams were expected to win at a very high rate compared to the rest of the 
league.   This perception clearly was shared by the minds of the public whose cries 
against large market team spending grew louder during this time period. 
 The final trend seen occurred during the years 2001 to 2006.  The Index of 
Dissimilarity still saw the league becoming increasingly unbalanced during this time 
frame.  However, the coefficients of team strength show that there was convergence of 
Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 teams to move more back in line with Quartile 1 teams.   
 This trend clearly illustrates why there was such a greater variety of World Series 
champions during this time period.  The gap between Quartile 1 and Quartile 2 teams 
narrowed greatly with Quartile 3 teams trending heavily upwards.  Simply, the 
dominance of a few teams was lessoned by the emergence of steeper competition from 
Quartile 2 and Quartile 3. 
 Another interesting note about this trend is the fact that the Index of Dissimilarity 




the steep drop in quality of play from the teams in Quartile 4.  Illustrating the problem 
with viewing the league as a whole to examine competitive balance, the struggles of 
Quartile 4 teams offset the increased quality of play from Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 teams.  
The league actually saw much more competition at the top, as evident by the increased 
variety of champions, but was seen to show little increase in competitiveness due to a few 
teams at the bottom. 
5.2 Payroll Trend Analysis 
 The results of the team strength coefficient regression showed three 
distinct trends.  The hypothesis put forth by fans as to why these trends occurred falls on 
the back of team payroll spending.   According to the general public,   the trends would 
be explained by the rise and fall of large market team spending.  This can easily be put to 
the test by examining if there was a corresponding change in large market team spending 
patterns to go along with these changing trends of competitive balance. 
Simply all that needs to be done is to examine the payroll relationship between 
Quartile 1 and the other Quartiles during the years in which there was trending 
converging or diverging level of competitive balance.   For example during the years 
1993 thru 2000, Quartile 1’s payroll relationship to Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 should be 
diverging compared to the prior years 1989 to 1992.  The below shows what should be 













Quartile 2 Close Growing Far apart Growing very close
Quartile 3 Close Growing Far apart Growing somewhat close
 
  A quick glance at the graph below shows the payroll trends do not correspond to 
the trends in team strength as expected.  Most notably, Quartile 1’s payroll relationship 
with Quartile 3 is relatively stagnant over the entire time period.   In fact the only time 
period where Quartile 1 makes consistent and significant growth over Quartile 3, is 












Figure 7-  Quartile 1’s Payroll Relationship  
 
 
 A similar trend is seen with Quartile 1’s relationship with Quartile 2.  During 
1993-2000, Quartile 1 pulled away significantly from Quartile 2 in terms of team 
strength.  Quartile 1’s payroll in comparison to Quartile 2 actually went down from 1989-
1995 and really didn’t start pulling away sharply until the 2000’s.  The effect seen here is 
almost inverse to what was expected. 
 Putting the graphs trends in more concrete and discernible numbers, the chart 
below analyzed the trend in Quartile 2’s payroll in comparison to Quartile 1 and Quartile 
2’s quality of play.  Quartile 1 experienced rampant success during the mid and late 90’s, 

























































































small increase in the payroll gap between the two Quartiles corresponding with Quartile 2 
having a huge 23% drops in its average coefficient of team strength.     
Table 5- Quartile 1 and Quartile 2 Comparison 
Years Q1 Team Strength % Change Q1/Q2 Team Salary % Change2 Q2 Team Strength%  Change
1989-1992 0.01011862 1.215090376 0.00665
1993-2000 0.037886767 377% 1.247809792 2.70% 0.00509 -23%
2001-2006 0.0355252 -6% 1.404889414 13% 0.01961 385%  
 On face value, it seems impractical that Quartile 1 increasing its payroll gap over 
Quartile 2 by 2.7% would correspond to Quartile 1 experiencing a 377% growth in team 
strength coefficients while Quartile 2 experiences a 2.7% drop.    Going a few years 
further, the likelihood that payroll gaps are the driving factor in the competitive balance 
between the two Quartiles grows even smaller.  During 2001-2006, Quartile 1’s team 
strength coefficient dropped 6%.  Six percent, despite the fact that it actually increased its 
margin in terms of payroll in terms by 13%.  Conversely, Quartile 2 was payroll was 
actually poorer in comparison to Quartile 1 during this time frame, but increased its team 
strength coefficients by 385%. 
 Logically, team payroll gaps cannot be the driving force affecting the competitive 
levels amongst the teams in the league.  A small positive change in the payroll ratio in the 
90’s saw a huge change in the gap of competitive play, but a much larger positive change 






6.  Conclusion 
Fans have long complained of the big market dilemma in baseball where the 
teams in the largest cities had an unfair advantage over the rest of the league.  This issue 
accumulated fervent support after the New York Yankees reeled off four World Series 
wins in five years in the late 1990’s.   Numerous studies followed to examine the big 
market dilemma and the competitive balance of baseball in general and the conclusions 
of the studies varied mostly dependent on the method the authors used to define 
competitive balance.  This paper examined those studies and saw what could be leading 
to drastically different conclusions:  classical statistics such as wins do not truly tell how 
strong a team’s quality of play is.  
 This paper elected to use betting lines as the measure of competitive play to offer 
a bridge between the stat sheet and the eye test.  The paper tested the accuracy of betting 
lines, used betting lines to measure league balance as a whole with an Index of 
Dissimilarity, and then finally used in a regression analysis test to show betting lines 
relationship with team payroll. 
With the Indices of Dissimilarity based on the betting lines, the league was seen 
to get increasingly and significantly less balanced from 1989 -2006.  However, this left a 
lot to be explained as while the league was getting increasingly less balanced, there were 
a greater variety of World Series champions.  Additionally, the Indices of Dissimilarity 
do not give an insight into competitive balance with respect to team payroll.  While the 




relationship between the team payroll and a team’s ability, there is no way to get an 
accurate picture of what is actually taking place. 
 To get an insight into the relationship between team payroll and team ability, this 
paper needed to calculate a statistic that could accurately be used to compare a team’s 
strength with respect to the rest of the teams in the league.   Betting lines were chosen as 
they forewent problems such as weak divisional play and relied solely on market 
perception of the team’s ability.  Next, the betting lines were converted into probabilities 
and then plugged into a pricing model developed by Raymond Sauer.  This pricing model 
was run as a statistical regression to return coefficients to show how much a team being 
involved in the game positively or negative influenced the money lines.  These 
coefficients effectively turned the gambling markets perception of a team’s ability into a 
quantifiable statistic that could be compared against one another. 
 These coefficients allowed a clearer insight into the story of competitive balance 
than was being told by fans perception, win statistics, or the I.D. of the money lines.   
Fans argued that the rampant spending by big market teams was destroying the 
competitive balance of the league.  Win statistics showed no clear trend giving a clear 
indication that the competitiveness of the league was changing hand in hand with the 
payroll gaps.  The I.D. of money lines supported fan perception that the league was 
becoming increasing less balanced. 
 However, the coefficients for team strength allowed this paper to discover an 




examined, the top three quartiles were grouped closely together.  A divergence between 
these quartiles reinforced fan’s sentiment that Quartile 1 teams were beginning to 
dominant the league.  The interesting aspect here, however, occurred in the early 2000’s 
with the convergence of the top three quartiles once again.   This went relatively 
unnoticed when examining the league as a whole, because Quartile 4 teams experienced a 
corresponding drop in competitive play. 
 Evidence of Quartile 1 separating itself in terms of competitive play was found in 
this paper.  The team strength coefficients saw Quartile 1 drastically become more 
expected to win an average random game during the years 1993 to 2000.  This is roughly 
the time period examined by the Blue Ribbon Panel after an onslaught of criticism about 
the competitive balance of the league as onlookers saw the New York Yankees win four 
World Series in a five year span. 
 The Blue Ribbon Panel saw Quartile 1 teams separate themselves in a similar 
manner as this paper, but came to a significantly different conclusion why.    
Superficially, the Blue Ribbon Panel looked at the overall percent growth of the team 
payrolls for each quartile during this time period and saw Quartile 1 grow at a 
significantly faster rate than the other three quartiles.  This led to the panel to conclude 
that team payroll gaps were the driving factor between growing gaps in quality of play 
between the teams.  
 This paper did not take such a shallow look and came to a distinctly different 




examined during different periods where their competitiveness with one another is seen 
to be converging or diverging, then relationship between team payroll gaps and gaps in 
team ability found by the Blue Ribbon Panel is not so conclusive.  In fact, this paper saw 
Quartile 1 pull away from Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 in team payroll during the same years 
that Quartile 2 and Quartile 3 drastically became increasingly more competitive. 
 This paper concludes that there have been significant trends and fluctuations of 
competitive balance during the time period examined (1989-2006).   Due to the inverse 
relationship seen with the team payroll relationships and competitive balance gaps in the 
2000’s, this paper goes against popular belief and  concludes team payroll gaps were not 
the cause for the changing level of competitive balance.  This paper also finds betting 
lines to be a more accurate indicator of competitive balance than win statistics.  Previous 
literature found little progress made in the 2000’s in terms of competitive balance.  
Spurred on by the increased variety of World Series champions, this paper evaluated 
these years specifically and found a huge increase in competitive play from Quartiles 2 
and Quartile 3.  The betting lines picked up information that the win statistics were not 
and explained why there have been so many different World Series champions since the 






Appendix A:Team Payroll and Team strength statistics 
Table A-1: Payroll Pre-Strike Years by Quartile 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Q1 18,789,068 21,959,322 32,471,417 41,655,348 40,684,405 41,089,948 
Q2 15,004,775 19,682,500 26,357,695 33,046,003 36,249,276 36,343,494 
Q3 11,386,841 15,790,928 21,853,881 28,270,810 27,104,429 28,711,147 
Q4 8,906,594 12,358,832 16,283,156 17,457,361 18,107,769 19,965,192 
 
Table A-2: Team Coefficients Pre-Strike Years by Quartile 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Q1 0.014364 0.009315 0.015694 0.001102 0.020454 0.034427 
Q2 0.017436 0.009757 -0.00147 0.000871 0.006612 0.00316 
Q3 0.000823 -0.00098 0.008321 0.014052 -0.00053 -0.00116 
Q4 -0.03567 -0.01955 -0.02382 -0.02822 -0.02724 -0.03095 
 
Table A-3:  Payroll of the late 1990’s 
QUARTILE 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Q1 42,188,291 45,214,207 59,148,877 58,778,131 76,048,926 
Q2 34,079,368 36,078,239 43,667,548 47,550,625 56,318,258 
Q3 29,039,965 26,662,154 35,133,369 34,914,802 40,590,237 







Table A-4: Team Coefficients of the late 1990’s 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Q1 0.024388 0.03726 0.03785 0.052302 0.05501 
Q2 -0.00523 0.007464 
-
0.00475 0.031327 0.008085 
Q3 -0.00041 -0.00995 
-
0.00454 -0.03837 -0.01152 
Q4 -0.04216 -0.03477 
-
0.02856 -0.04426 -0.05109 
 
 
Table A-5: Payroll of the 2000’s 
QUARTILE 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Q1 84,198,334 99,710,432 103,685,097 110,348,552 112,195,608 115,524,488 116,420,317 
Q2 64,899,120 73,895,442 73,734,760 77,736,667 76,597,656 79,905,863 86,635,973 
Q3 48,146,458 52,711,375 53,749,448 55,167,637 52,440,906 57,995,460 64,926,954 
Q4 26,003,881 29,659,179 39,858,312 41,783,976 36,226,884 40,000,700 42,751,579 
 
Table A-6: Team strength coefficients of the 2000’s 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Q1 0.041403 0.034993 0.053894 0.041849 0.02487 0.030414 0.027132 
Q2 -0.00593 0.023677 0.022057 0.025282 0.016566 0.013955 0.016136 
Q3 -0.01224 -0.03507 -0.0467 -0.0041 -0.01484 -0.00553 -0.00149 
Q4 -0.02927 -0.01249 -0.02573 -0.07012 -0.02685 -0.03898 -0.04387 
 
Table A-7: Long Shot Bias 
 
99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
win % 52% 54% 53% 54% 56% 54% 55% 55% 
bet line 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 






Levin, R. C., Mitchell, G. J., Volcker, P. A., & Will, G. F. (2000). “The Report of the                         
 independent members of the commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel on baseball  
 economics.” Retrieved January 15, 2009 from Major League Baseball Website: 
 http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue_ribbon.pdf 
Martin Schmidt and David Berri. “Competitive Balance and Market Size in Major 
 League Baseball:  A Response to Baseball’s Blue Ribbon Panel.” Review  of 
 Industrial Organization, 21 (2002), 41-54.     
Schmidt, M. B., & Berri, D. J. (2001). “Competitive balance and attendance: The case of 
 Major  League Baseball”. Journal of Sports Economics, 2(2), 145-167. 
Paul, Rodney J., Weinbach, Andrew P., Borghesi, Rick, and Wilson, Mark. “Using  
 BettingMarket Odds to Measure the Uncertainty of Outcome in Major  
 League Baseball,” International Journal of Sport Finance, 4(4), (2009). 
Brown, William O & Sauer, Raymond D, 1993. "Does the Basketball Market Believe in 
 the Hot Hand? Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic 
 Association, vol. 83(5),pages 1377- 1386. Dec. 1993. 
Raymond D. Sauer, 1998. "The Economics of Wagering Markets." Journal of Economic 
 Literature,  American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 2021-2064, Dec. 
 1998. 
M. Elanjian and D. Pachamanova. “Is Revenue Sharing Working for Major 
 LeagueBaseball? A Historical Perspective.” The Sport Journal, 12(2), Apr. 2009. 
“MLB Team Salaries." USA News. Web. 26 Nov. 2011.  
 
. "Industry Information." American Gaming Association. American Gaming Association. 
 Web.  22  Dec 2011.  
WOODLAND, L. M. and WOODLAND, B. M. (1994). “Market Efficiency and the 
 Favorite- Longshot Bias: The Baseball Betting Market.” The Journal of Finance, 
 49: 269–279.  
Woodland, L. M. and Woodland, B. M. (2003). The Reverse Favourite–longshot Bias 
 and Market Efficiency in Major League Baseball: An Update. Bulletin of 
 Economic Research, 55: 113–123.  
   
